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Abstract 
This paper discusses a number of important problems regarding administration of justice 
in different legal areas and jurisdictions across the legal hierarchies in different countries 
throughout the world. It is argued that the Supreme Courts can address these problems 
through strategic use of its policy instruments. The paper discusses a number of important 
and pressing problems plaguing the courts all over the world. These problems range from 
litigation explosion, delay (backlogs) and caseload problems in courts, corruption in the 
judiciary, problems of judicial review by a Supreme Court, inadequate standards of 
review, suboptimal legal innovations brought about by the judiciary and inefficiently 
designed judicial hierarchies. I argue that it is only the Supreme Court, through strategic 
use of its policy instruments, can bring about solutions to these problems and the 
desirable results.  
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Section 1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the publication of the first edition of “Economic Analysis of Law”, in 1973 by 
Richard Posner, the law and economics movement has been growing with remarkable 
speed. The growth has come about in terms of a variety of journals with informed 
theoretical and empirical contributions from an increasing group of specialized scholars 
in the field and publications of other important textbooks and one voluminous 
encyclopedia and numerous conferences on the subject held every year throughout the 
globe. Not surprisingly, the focus is no more merely on the optimal design of tort law, 
property rights and contract enforcement. Modern concerns cover terrorism, religious 
freedom, human rights, financial markets regulation, bankruptcy law, environmental law, 
employment regulation and other different aspects of law deemed important for economic 
development, social welfare and prudential regulation. Despite the branching of the 
subject, there is an underlying coherence in the subject. The coherence can be understood 
in terms of analyzing the positive effects of a legal rule on the allocation of resources 
caused by rational1 socio-economic actors. This kind of analysis can enable policy 
makers to recommend the set of legal rules that maximizes social welfare. This 
philosophy has had major impact on the actual framing of a law in a legal system and on 
how judges actually decide a case. Tort law, child labor law, environmental law, 
intellectual property law, telecommunication law, to name a few, have incorporated the 
                                                 
1
 By rationality we mean the capability of goal induced actions taking into account 
constraints and knowledge of the consequences of different courses of actions. The 
modern trend is also to take into account the psychological and strategic aspects of the 
decision making by agents. 
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basic philosophical doctrine. 
 
Substantive law have been much discussed in the literature. In this paper, I restrict my 
analysis of the substantive law to legal transplantations and reinterpretation of precedents. 
Instead, I examine mostly the procedural aspects of law as designed by the Supreme 
Court (hereafter referred to as SC) of a country. A SC is discussed in this paper in terms 
of its objectives, resources, policy instruments and constraints. A review of some various 
SCs is done to understand the differences and similarities between them in terms of these 
aspects. This paper discusses a number of important problems regarding administration of 
justice in different legal areas and jurisdictions across the legal hierarchies in different 
countries throughout the world. It is argued that the SCs can address these problems 
through strategic use of its policy instruments. I then explore the strategic interactions 
between the SC and other social agents like litigants, judges, the legislator and the 
executive, and then characterize the optimal policies for SCs.  
 
The paper discusses a number of important and pressing problems plaguing the courts all 
over the world. These problems range from litigation explosion, delay (backlogs) and 
caseload problems in courts, corruption in the judiciary, problems of judicial review by 
SC, inadequate standards of review, suboptimal legal innovations brought about by the 
judiciary and inefficiently designed judicial hierarchies. The magnitude of these problems 
cannot be underestimated. While the lower courts are not unexpectedly burdened with 
these problems, the highest courts of appeal, i.e., the SCs in most countries are also 
suffering on these counts.  It is the legal system, that has been entirely affected, with 
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deleterious consequences for the society and the economy on whose behalf the legal 
system administers justice. While these problems have long been recognized in each legal 
system, numerous informed debates and knowledgeable committees have not been able to 
produce desirable results through legal reforms. I argue that it is only the SC, through 
strategic use of its policy instruments, can bring about solutions to these problems and the 
desirable results.  
 
Why are judicial reforms instituted throughout the globe of limited success and not 
meeting expectations despite so many informed debates and discussions, plethora of 
policy recommendations, measures by different law ministries, repeated initiatives at the 
different SCs throughout the world and despite continuing judicial reforms? Why do the 
problems persist? One answer offered by the policy makers is that there exist differences 
between planning and implementation: judicial hierarchy reorganization usually creates a 
lot of implementation problems, sometimes the upper-tier tries to regulate the lower tier 
without proper local information while at other times decentralization result in lack of 
coordination and appropriate legal and judiciary standards. As far as litigation explosion 
and the associated caseload crisis are concerned, policy makers feel that there seems to be 
little that can be done through traditional measures. An important factor behind delay and 
high backlogs are the procedural complexities of courts. But these procedures have their 
intrinsic reasons – they serve as checks and balances to guarantee freedom through 
judicial independence and constitutional review as pointed out by La Porta et. al. (2004). 
Moreover, procedures generate correct and relevant information and reduce the cost of 
errors in trials. So there are obvious limits to simplification of procedures. Corruption 
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too, seems to be difficult to control with incentives and penalties. Policy makers and 
analysts have observed that legal innovations brought about through legal 
transplantations, are not always suitable without proper adaptation to indigenous demand 
and supply conditions: in other words, straightforward legal transplantations (importing 
legal and judicial best practices from the developed world) does not always work 
(Milhaupt and Pistor (2008)). Strengthening the system of judicial review under the 
constraints of weak judiciary and lack of democracy seems to be almost impossible to 
some. Improving the system of appellate review requires high-powered and transparent 
system that the SC seems to be ambiguous about. Certainly, there are merits to these 
arguments. However, the arguments are neither necessary nor sufficient for dissuading us 
from constructing a proper theoretical framework that can inform and improve policy.  
 
Planning for maximizing social welfare can proceed along different dimensions. The SC 
as a social planner seeks to maximize social welfare through the judicial system. The 
maximization of the social welfare function with respect to policy instruments should be 
viewed as being subject to the constraints on the effectiveness of the policy imposed by 
the behavioral reactions of the different agents. Thus the effectiveness of a policy 
depends on the strategic behavior of agents while the behavior of agents depends on the 
policy adopted. This motivates a game theoretic analysis of the problem. A game 
analyzes strategic interaction of agents where their actions and payoffs are dependent on 
each other. For applications of game theory in the analysis of Legal problems see Baird, 
Gertner and Picker (1998), Cooter and Ulen (2004), Shavell (2004) and Spurr (2010). 
This approach is increasing becoming popular in academic and popular discourse for 
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obvious practical and theoretical reasons. 
 
The different actors in the legal hierarchy act in a strategic setting and condition their best 
response actions according to their guesses and knowledge of what other players 
(including the policy maker or the SC) are playing in subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium. 
The policy maker or the SC usually has a first mover advantage in the game and can thus 
influence the outcome of the game substantively. It is of utmost importance that the 
policy maker understands how the different agents in the demand and supply side react to 
a policy. As the judicial policy changes, so does the behavior of the agents like litigants, 
courts and judges. A policy maker must take these behavioral changes into account 
before being informed by a suitable theory and implementing a (change in) policy2. This 
is the first step in the construction of a proper theory and policy of judicial reform. The 
next step is to put in agent preferences and constraints  relevant for the SC environment. 
The third step is to posit a social welfare function (that maximizes the specific impact of 
a policy that is in the general interest of the general public and agents in the SCs) which 
can be quantified and maximized with respect to choice variables.  
 
We realize that the policy instruments or the choice variables of the social planner (Chief 
Justice of a SC and /or the Law Ministry) are too numerous and varied (also, only some 
of them can be amenable to quantitative analysis while others are essentially qualitative). 
As far as quantitative analysis is concerned, we restrict ourselves to finding the optimal 
litigation fees (court fees), bench strength (the total number of judges at the SC) and 
                                                 
2
 See Lucas, R. (1976) and also Kydland, F. and E. Prescott (1977). 
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judicial compensation (to deter corruption) as the only quantitative policy instruments for 
the social planner as affecting litigation rates and caseloads. Given the different problems 
enunciated, we have categorized social planner welfare functions into different categories 
that deals with each problem3. The problems of high litigation rates and high caseload per 
judges are variables which are endogenous in any reasonable model of litigation and 
judicial decision making, and this approach will be taken here. The second half of our 
analysis discusses the effectiveness of qualitative policy instruments in a strategic setting. 
We review the strategic role of the SC and the issue of effectiveness of judicial review, 
legal innovations, standards of review and the appropriate design of the judicial hierarchy 
as mediated by the SC and the law ministry of a country. 
 
The present paper thus deals with some very pressing problems of society with regard to 
broad and different aspects of justice and should be seen as an original and benchmark 
study as well as a complementary analysis to different contributions in the literature 
mentioned above. It sheds important lights of the problems discussed with regard to the 
apex judicial organizations by laying down a preliminary as well as an extended 
theoretical and institutional analysis in an abstract way.  
 
In Section 2, we review the SC as an institution. The institutional analysis covers the SCs 
of a number of developed and developing countries. Section 3 discusses in detail, the 
procedural problems of legal hierarchies all over the world. Section 4 discusses the 
                                                 
3
 A Multi-goal programming is also feasible that discusses the tradeoffs involved from 
pursuing some incompatible aspects of policies. Such a discussion is relegated to the end 
of section 2.  
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effectiveness of quantitative and section 5 the qualitative policy instruments in a strategic 
setting. Section 6 concludes by discussing the policy implications of the paper in general 
and in different institutional settings.  
 
Section 2. The Supreme Courts – A Comparative Review 
 
The SC is the embodiment of the highest form of justice. The SC sets legal standards for 
the entire legal hierarchy. In some countries, it interprets laws and the Constitution and 
tries to provide uniformity in the application and interpretation of laws. The SC tries to 
see that an efficient substantive and procedural legal system is in place. It has the 
objective of making access to justice easy, efficient and equitable. It tries to minimize 
delay in the adjudication of legal proceedings in the SC and sometimes has the mandate 
to intervene in lower court adjudication to minimize delay and injustice. The SC seeks to 
reduce caseload of judges to a reasonable amount and tries to minimize court backlogs 
which is related to minimizing delay. Through all this, the SC tries to achieve an efficient 
and high quality justice. However, this idealistic view about the SC can be challenged, it 
indeed faces a number of significant constraints. Nevertheless, the legal institutional 
setup is such that the SC vigorously acts to achieve social welfare within the bounds 
setup by the constraints.  
 
There is a big controversy as to the real power of a SC. The Constitution of a country 
creates the SC through an Act. Thus the SC policy instruments are subject to the 
Constitutional provisions and proscriptions as they stand in their original garb as well in 
  
9 
amendments. The SC is nevertheless the highest court of a country (unless the country 
has a separate Constitutional Court) and under it are the federal courts, state high courts, 
district high courts etc. The SC is the highest court of appeal and besides its appellate 
jurisdiction, it also has some original jurisdiction and the power of judicial review. The 
judges of a SC are appointed by the executive, with advice from the legislature. Thus, it 
can be argued that the SC is heavily influenced by Legislative and Executive policy. 
Usually, the legislature determines the number of judges and it requires special 
legislation to change the number of judges in the SC of a country. However, the SC also 
has its power to review legislative and executive wisdom. We add though, that those 
following the law will have noticed the limitation of this power. The SC is frequently 
involved in Constitutional politics through its power of judicial review (examples: SC of 
the United States, Indian SC). The power of judicial review has only been inadequately 
outlined in many Constitutions and has become only clearer in scope through the process 
of adjudication of adversarial proceedings. Thus, it only through the unfolding of the 
judicial and legislative process that the truth about the real nature of the power of the SC 
can be understood. 
 
According to the Constitution of the USA, the original jurisdiction of the SC shall extend 
to all cases, in Law and Equity arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the US and the 
treaties made. These cases or controversies under the original jurisdiction are primarily of 
four kinds: (1) those between the United States and one of the fifty states; (2) those 
between two or more states; (3) those involving foreign ambassadors, or ministers, or 
consuls; (4) those commenced by a state against aliens or against a foreign country. The 
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primary task of the US SC is appellate through powers conferred by the Congress under 
some statutes of the US Constitution, and in that capacity it tries to decide cases through 
correct and uniform interpretation of the Constitution. Cases reach the SC for appellate 
review in three ways: (1) on a writ of appeal, as a matter of right; (2) on a writ of 
certiorari, as a matter of SC discretion; and (3) certification. All these appellate cases 
must involve a Constitutional question or Federal Law. The UK SC has limited original 
jurisdiction and prefers to hear appeal cases which involve points of law of general public 
importance. It has extended reach thoughout the United Kingdom. The French Supreme 
Court (established in 1790) is the court of last resort in France but its scope of review is 
limited to question of law and not on facts4. The SC does not hear Constitutional cases or 
cases against the Government. For these there are other courts. France has not one but 
four senior courts and collectively they form the topmost tier of the judicial system. As 
far as the composition of the SC is concerned, there are justices, Office of the Prosecutor, 
Administrative Officer and specially certified barristers. The Indian SC has been 
established by part V, Chapter IV of the Indian Constitution and has served since 1950. 
As indicated in the Constitution, it is to serve as a federal court, guardian of the 
constitution and the highest court of appeal. It also takes writ petitions in case of serious 
human rights violations5. The SC of Uganda is the highest judicial organ in Uganda. Its 
powers are derived from Article 130 of the 1995 Constitution. It is generally an appellate 
court with only a few circumstances like Presidential election petition giving rise to 
original jurisdiction. Below the SC, is the Constitutional Court, the High Court and the 
                                                 
4
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_court 
5
 Source: http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SupremeCourt 
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Magistrate’s Court6. The SC of the Russian Federation 7 is the court of last resort in 
Russian administrative law, civil law and criminal law cases. It also has the supervisory 
power over the lower courts. The SC judges are nominated by the President, and 
appointed by the Federation Council. Plenary Sessions are held atleast thrice annually, 
and the SC reviews the functioning of the lower courts and provides uniform 
interpretation of laws. Judicial precedent is not recognized as a source of law but courts 
generally follow precedents. The SC has original jurisdiction in the following cases: (1) 
Challenges to acts of the Federal Assembly, decrees of the President and the Government 
(2) Challenging of delegated legislation of governmental agencies (3) Termination of 
political parties and NGOs and (4) Challenging of actions of Central Election 
Commission 
 
A SC usually has 5 to 15 judges (the number can vary a lot like between 5 in Argentina 
and 125 in France). A low number of judges frequently increase administrative 
coordination of justice but results in high case loads and popular demand for increasing 
the number of judges. The SC is dependent on the executive for enforcement of a 
decision arrived at through adjudication. The maximum number of sitting judges is a 
constraint some countries with a federal setup like USA and Argentina. There are 
currently only nine seats on the US SC. The power to nominate Justices is vested in the 
President of the US and appointments are made with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. Thus, it is not at easy to increase the number of judges. India follows a contingent 
policy based on special and popular demands for increasing the number of judges. The 
                                                 
6
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme Court of Uganda 
7
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme Court of Russia 
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original Constitution of India (1950) provisioned for a Supreme Court with a Chief 
Justice and 7 lower-ranking Judges—leaving it to Parliament to increase this number. In 
the early years, a full bench of the Supreme Court sat together to hear the cases presented 
before them. As the work of the Court increased and cases began to accumulate, 
Parliament increased the number of Judges from 8 in 1950 to 11 in 1956, 14 in 1960, 18 
in 1978, 26 in 1986 and 31 in 2008. As the number of the Judges has increased, they sit in 
smaller Benches of two and three (referred to as a Division Bench)—coming together in 
larger Benches of 5 and more only when required (referred to as a Constitutional Bench) 
to do so or to settle a difference of opinion or controversy. In France, there are quite a 
few (125) judges in the SC.  
 
The SC seeks to minimize corruption by offering high compensation of judges and 
bringing high penalties like impeachment and imprisonment in force when corruption is 
detected. However, proven corruption cases are only few in number and 
disproportionately low relative to the actual global incidence of judicial corruption (see 
Report of the Transparency International (2007)). Political instability and frequent 
turnover of judges is another important welfare concern. In Argentina8 the administration 
of the SC was regularly disrupted by military coups and executive interference, which 
frequently led to dismissal or resignation of justices and inconsistency in rulings and 
instability in composition. In order to secure a stable position, a judge would always rule 
in favor of the executive. It was only in 2004 that judicial system got some independence 
and the executive and the legislature became effectively accountable to the public to 
                                                 
8
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SupremeCourtofArgentina 
  
13 
maintain democracy and not try to influence the judiciary.  
 
However, safeguards have also been built to prevent arbitrary removals of judges.  The 
American SC has successfully prevented impeachment in some cases. India is another 
important example. The Indian Constitution seeks to ensure the independence of Supreme 
Court Judges in various ways. A Judge of the Supreme Court cannot be removed from 
office, except by an order of the President passed after an address in each House of 
Parliament, supported by a majority of the total membership of that House, and by a 
majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, and presented to the 
President in the same Session, for such removal on the ground of proved misbehavior or 
incapacity.  
 
Through suitable judicial review, the SC tries to uphold the Constitution against any 
arbitrary legislation by the legislature or any unconstitutional act by the executive. The 
SC of the United States has the powers of judicial review, first asserted in Calder v Bull 
(1798) by the dissenting opinion of Justice Iredell and later given binding authority by 
Justice Marshall in Marbury v Madison (1803). In the exercise of judicial review, the 
power of legislature over the SC is an important constraint since the legislature can bring 
about constitutional amendments. The legislature can also restrict the right of SC to 
overturn primary legislation. The power of judicial review of UK SC is limited: it can 
only overturn secondary legislation. However, through separation from the Legislative 
function, the court has increased its autonomy and effectiveness in challenging legislative 
wisdom. The Indian SC can take pride having delivered 24,000 reported judgments with 
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impeccable dexterity and authority, it has faced serious controversies also. The role of the 
SC has been questioned in a big way during the emergency proclaimed by Mrs. Gandhi. 
The SC has also been seen to oppose land reforms bill initiated in the Indian parliament 
to protect property rights of incumbent land holders. In the post 1980 period the Indian 
SC has been more proactive and assertive. The Supreme Court of the Republic of China 
is the Court of last resort in China though matters regarding the interpretation of the 
Constitution and unifying the laws and orders are entrusted to the Constitutional Court of 
the Judicial Yuan, which is a branch of the Government9. Thus, it can be clearly seen that 
the Chinese SC is not independent of the executive and is supervised by the Judicial 
Yuan. Unlike China, there is complete separation of powers in Japan where the Judiciary 
functions independently of the Legislature and the Executive. Appeals are entertained 
only if violation of the Constitutional Law, or conflict with judicial precedents are 
suggested.  
 
The SC seeks to bring in efficient legal innovations through changes in legal procedure, 
revaluation of legal precedents and adaptation of legal transplantation. The US SC has 
created many important landmarks which have served as precedents (with applicable 
Stare Decisis) for future cases. Some examples include cases on balance of power 
between states and the federal government, judicial independence, exclusivity of the SC 
jurisdiction, segregation, right of abortion, antitrust, affirmative action, substantive due 
process, campaign finance regulation and federalism10  
                                                 
9
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SupremeCourtoftheRepublicofChina 
10
  Source: www.supremecourt.gov, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme Court of the 
United States, Abraham (1975) 
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It is the prerogative of the SC to set standards of appellate review and it tries to bring in 
efficiency of the allocation of time with respect to such standards. Some aspects of the 
French SC are quite special with respect to the process of appeals. When an appeal case 
is overturned, it is remanded to a second appellate court. Further, when no appeal is 
made, but the Government disagrees with the interpretation of the law by the lower court, 
it may order the Chief Prosecutor to bring an appeal to the SC in the interest of the law. 
Further, unlike common-law jurisdictions, there is no doctrine of binding precedent 
(Stare Decisis). The Japanese SC has a strict standard of review. When appeals come to 
the Japanese SC, written documents are examined first, and only if they indicate a proper 
ground of appeal, are oral arguments heard. 
 
The SC is in charge of the administration and reorganization of the judiciary in order to 
improve efficiency of the justice system. The lack of effective supervisory control over 
lower courts serve as a constraint in the attempt to reform the entire judiciary 
organization countries like India or USA. In USA the SC is highly dependent on the 
Congress which confers rule making powers for the SC for procedures to be followed by 
the lower courts. UK and Japan are exceptions. The UK SC has the power to resolve 
disputes regarding devolution of jurisdiction across the judicial hierarchy. In addition to 
the exercise of judicial power, the Japanese SC also exercises rule making power with 
respect to matters related to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts, and the 
administration of judicial powers.  
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Section 3. The Problems of the Legal Hierarchy 
 
The first problem that we discuss is that of court delays11 which renders the legal system 
costly and inefficient. Ietswaart (1990) makes an international comparison of delays in 
court cases in Europe. While there are cross country variations, delay in general is 
endemic. Evidence mainly from the USA suggests that caseloads in the SC tend to 
increase exponentially between decades (Jucewicz and Baum (1990), Casper and Posner 
(1974), etc.), rendering the problems of dealing with appeals, reducing backlogs12 and 
timely and efficient delivery of justice by the Supreme Courts quite difficult to solve. In 
developed countries other than the USA, the problems of regulating complex human and 
institution interaction, guidance of the financial markets and corporate governance have 
put their systems legal under great pressure13.  In emerging market countries such as 
India, there has been significant delay in the legal system as shown in the Appendix 
(Table 1).  
 
                                                 
11
 First, let us describe what exactly we mean by delays in the courts (Levin (1975) gives 
a similar account)).  The delay, according to our description, involves two elements: the 
age of the case and the amount of court time per hearing devoted to it.  The age of a case 
at any point of time is the number of rounds of hearing the case has proceeded.  The 
second element refers to the amount of time that the judge (and clerks, 
administrators,litigants etc.) actually devotes to a particular case during a single round of 
hearing. However, in the present analysis, delay will be denoted by the average time 
taken to dispose of a case in a single round of hearing, while the age of the case will be 
denoted as an increasing function of the backlog or court congestion which we define 
next below. 
12
 The Backlog or the Congestion Rate denoted as B, is defined as the fraction of cases 
filed which are undecided. In the multi stage game depicted here, backlogs are 
determined at the end of the game, while in a repeated game backlogs consist of appeals 
accumulated at the end of each of the stage games. 
13
 See in particular Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) 
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An important reason for delay and high caseload is the slow administration of justice. In 
the Indian context, several problems with regard to the supply side issues of court 
administration have been identified14, like high frequency of adjournments, high 
paperwork, inadequate number and productivity of judges, low autonomy and high cost 
for the lower courts, complexity of civil and administrative procedures etc. These factors 
are not special to the Indian case but applicable world-wide and especially in the 
developing economies and transition economies. It is recognized that supply side 
imperfections of the judicial machinery arise as necessary checks and balances so that the 
judicial process can secure justice in the best manner possible. However, there can be 
scope for reforms in the judicial processes that should certainly be carefully explored. 
The above mentioned problems at the top as well at the lower levels of the legal hierarchy 
are true for almost every developing country and the common practice is to combat these 
through supply side measures like simplification of procedural law, efficient legal 
innovations and prudential legal transplantation.  In this connection, Buscaglia and 
Dakolias (1996) examine judicial reforms to combat delay in some Latin American 
countries.  In each of these countries, committees on these matters have suggested legal 
reforms to speed up the administration of justice but with legal reforms have had little 
effectiveness in reducing delay and caseloads. 
 
Much attention has been paid to the problems of excessive litigation and appeals at the 
top of the legal hierarchy throughout the world. Debate and discussion among the general 
                                                 
14
 See Dhawan (1978, 1986), J. Shaha Committee Report (1972), Justice Satish Chandra 
Committee Report (1986), Justice V. Mallimath Committee Report (1990) and the Report 
No. 230 - Law Commission of India (2009).   
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public, influential mass media, and policy makers (law ministries, chief justices of SCs) 
have been going on regarding these issues ever since these problems arose to adequately 
alarming proportions in different countries at different times. Several explanations have 
been forthcoming as to why these problems are endemic and persistent and different 
policy measures have been suggested in different settings. It is noteworthy that despite 
substantial interest on the implications of workload and backlogs for the SC in the US 
and many other low-trust litigious societies (see Casson (1991)), the causes of high-
frequency litigation are not completely understood. What can bring down frivolous law 
suits? Should legal fees be increased ? The causes of delay are varied, and have elicited 
several explanations based on both theoretical and empirical investigations.  Kessler 
(1996) identifies two basic sources of delay: the decision to litigate15 rather than try to 
settle a dispute and the decision regarding the late timing of settlement when it at all 
arises (pp. 432). The policy advice that follows as a corollary to this is to institutionalize 
cheap settlement and arbitration proceedings and give incentives to judges for faster 
disposition of cases (through monetary incentives as well as through peer pressure). But 
cheap and effective settlement and arbitration mechanisms do not work well in litigious 
societies where each litigant holds a high subjective probability of winning the case 
conditional on his information16 and possesses an adversarial personality (Casson 
(1991)).  
                                                 
15
 However, this general observation applies to all forms of judicial institutions where 
such activities can be carried out and is not peculiar to the Supreme Court (hereafter, SC).  
It is possible nevertheless that the problems of court congestion, delays in justice and 
consequent rise in the proportion of poorer quality of decisions in the lower courts can 
spillover to higher courts, including the SC.   
16
 More recent models include the role of private information in decision-making (see, 
Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a survey). 
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Controlling for supply side imperfections, litigation and appeals, the only remedy for 
decreasing the workload of the judges seems to be to distribute the workload among a 
higher number of judges. Why the number of judges are not substantially increased to 
increase the bench strength (By “bench strength”, we mean and denote the total number 
of judges in the SC and not the number of judges presiding over a single case in a 
particular occasion) at the SC level is also not well accounted for. One argument offered 
is that there is a lack of high quality judges at the lower courts who could be deemed 
suitable for promotion to the SC level, and that there exists lack of proper institutions for 
the training of judges. Further, the judges are, at least in principle, chosen with extreme 
caution, and only on the condition of their unquestionable integrity and efficiency, and 
this obviously reduces the number of potential candidates at any level of the judicial 
hierarchy and particularly at the SC level. Another reason is the following: it is widely 
known that appointments of SC judges are essentially political appointments, and like all 
political appointments, there are advantages in making the appointments strategically and 
selectively with the effect that supply is less than the effective demand for judges.  
 
Corruption in the judiciary is another area of concern and it has been noted in many 
reports that such corruption has increased with the liberalization of the developing 
economies. In other emerging market economies in East Asia there has been significant 
corruption due to crony capitalism as revealed by the East Asian Crisis which have 
subverted the legal system and weakened the judiciary. In the Latin American countries 
there has been significant delay in judicial decision making and corruption within and 
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outside the courts. In Eastern Europe and Africa there has been little legal certainty and 
lack of the rule of the law and in places like Cambodia there have been informal reports 
of high incidence of corruption and little effective rule of the law. Although corruption 
can sometimes reallocate resources efficiently, corruption is also morally degrading, 
tends to cause social instability and externalities on future allocation of economic 
resources. As such, a strong anticorruption policy is required but it is not clear how it can 
be strategically implemented. 
 
Judicial Review is another area of concern. Judicial review and a strong independent 
judiciary become necessary when majority power tends to subvert the minority interest or 
the reverse. It is always possible and certainly has been the case in numerous countries 
(particularly less developed countries) with powerful executive branch or a captured 
legislative branch of the government, for special interest groups to capture and leverage 
the democratic setups under such circumstances. Therefore, judicial review becomes a 
vitally important instrument in countries plagued by conflicts, corruption, lack of rule of 
law and weak democracies. Further, when, during emergencies, the power shifts from 
elected politicians to the president of a country, the judiciary must ensure through a 
proper review that such a transition is legal and constitutional and restore the proper 
democratic apparatus as soon as it can. However, the power of judicial review is vaguely 
defined in many constitutions thus creating strategic uncertainty in the battleground 
between the different arms of a government. This uncertainty is only gradually resolved 
the process of adjudication of adversarial legal proceedings and actions taken by the 
legislature or the executive. Frequently, this uncertainty creates a social welfare loss for 
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the country in question as decisions on important issues take considerable social time and 
costs to be decided. It should also be noted that non-federal states like England do not 
have the system of judicial review or have it imperfectly as in France and therefore have 
limited ability to tackle issues regarding legislative-judiciary conflict of interest and 
efficiency in the interpretation of the basic principles of law as found in jurisprudential 
thought over centuries. Judicial Review has also been imperfectly adopted in Europe 
where the separation of powers doctrine does not automatically guarantee it. In less 
developed countries, there are many such issues which are only partially resolved. In post 
world war Asia, Latin America and Africa the system of judicial review has been weak 
resulting in a movement away from “limited government” on many important socio-
political and economic questions resulting in arbitrary actions of the executive, reduction 
in political and economic liberty through repressive legislation and economic stagnation 
and underdevelopment. 
 
Legal innovations like changes in substantive law (e.g. law of negotiable instruments, 
commercial code, bankruptcy law, complex issues in property rights etc.) evolve 
spontaneously according to socio-economic changes but are slow when compared with 
legislative measures due to the history dependence created by important precedents. As 
discussed before, procedural law also tends to be complex and time consuming. An open 
minded approach on the importance of reinterpreting precedents with changing times and 
importing modern laws from outside to speed up the process of economic development is 
definitely warranted. Interestingly, Hammergren (2002) has noted that traditional 
institutional reforms imposed on the indigenous judicial system of some of the Latin 
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American countries have produced less than desirable results and have been 
counterproductive in some cases.  Innovations insensitive to local demand and supply 
conditions can turn out to be ineffective most of the times.  On the other hand, 
innovations adapted to local conditions stand a better chance of being successful. For 
example, Dakolias (1999) has reported that Peruvian justice administration improved 
considerably with the introduction of temporary courts.  
 
The system of appellate review is not strict in most countries leading to high rate of 
appeals from lower courts being heard at the level of the SC. Furthermore, the system of 
review by the justices under the stress of high workload also raises doubts on the quality 
(Casper and Posner (1974) p. 343) and rate (Jucewicz and Baum (1990)) of review. As 
this paper argues, by maintaining a more high powered system of appellate review, the 
policy maker can reduce the caseload per judge and give him less excuse for delay as a 
result of which delay and backlogs fall and timely and quality wise administration of 
justice increases. It should also be noted that judges will have to spend less time in 
screening appeals because of the system of a strict standards of review. The social 
optimum is reached when a system is achieved such that: (a) legal errors in lower courts 
are reversed systematically in higher courts so as to minimize in turn the errors in the 
lower courts themselves and (b) correct decisions in lower courts have the lowest 
probability of reaching higher courts and those reaching higher courts are validated to the 
maximum extent. For this to happen, decision making in the entire judicial hierarchy has 
to be efficient and there should be efficient selection of appeals based on signals from 
litigation.  
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Suboptimal judicial decentralization has resulted in low jurisdictions for lower courts in 
many countries. On the other hand, excessive decentralization in some Federalist 
countries have seen some major litigation issue being decided locally rather than 
centrally. In India, the inordinate delay, high backlogs in courts, and other mentioned 
problems have persisted primarily due to ineffective decentralization of the judiciary 
organization. While specialized law tribunals deal with cases faster than the non-
specialized courts, the rate of disposal of these tribunals can be increased further. The 
continuing delay and high backlogs  in BIFR, the bankruptcy law tribunal of India, is an 
important example (see Appendix, Table 2). Also, the lower courts have less than the 
required autonomy leading to higher number of appeals and congestions at upper courts 
like the SC.  The most important fact is that lower courts lack strong infrastructure, 
competent judges and adequate number of support staff. Further, the extent of jurisdiction 
is too limited in most cases. 
 
The focus of this study is the SC principally because of the following reasons: 
• The SC, through its use of policy instruments can improve court performance and 
reduction in the procedural problems of law at each level of the judicial hierarchy. 
The policy instruments at the SC level like bench strength (the number of sitting 
SC judges), compensation of judges, court fees at different tiers of the judicial 
hierarchy, the power of judicial review, legal innovations, standards of review17 
                                                 
17
 The SC, unlike lower courts, is endowed with pure discretionary rights on the selection 
of cases, acted upon by the Justices themselves and face rare reversals of the appellate 
decisions (Posner (1993)).  
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and decentralization of the judiciary organization determine the SC performance 
and judicial system efficiency. The SC payoffs (in terms of social welfare as 
achieved by minimizing the problems of the legal system) are affected by the 
actions of litigants, judges, the legislator and the executive. This warrants that the 
SC takes strategic actions that internalize the reaction of other actors in this 
framework of socio-legal games. The SC can strategically use the instruments 
under its control. Caseloads, delay and appeals should fall with a prudent use of 
these instruments not only at the SC level but also at the level of the lower courts. 
Strong democracy and high compensation and threats of impeachment militate 
against corruption. Optimal separation of powers will result when judicial review 
is strategically used. Allocative efficiency will result when legal innovations are 
brought about. Improved allocation of time will result when standard of review 
are efficiently designed and implemented. A decentralization of the judiciary 
through empowerment and responsible lower courts can result in supply side 
efficiency of justice.   
• The SC of a country sets the standards for the Judicial System. The case 
decisions, policy and use of judicial standards and instruments at the SC serve as 
benchmarks for litigation and decision making in lower courts. 
• The litigants in the lower courts still have an opportunity to take it to the next 
level, which those seeking justice from the apex body do not have.  The SC is the 
final resort for all litigants and very little can be done to overturn decisions in the 
SCs. 
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Section 4. Quantitative Policy Instruments 
 
When the welfare objective is reduction in caseload and delay reduction (as Posner 
(2007) points out), or when the objective is to have a corruption proof SC, the legal cases 
that need to be judged can be allocated through two mechanisms: the price mechanism 
(court fees and the salary of a SC judge) and rationing (delay in adjudication and a 
lengthy appeals process). In what follows, we characterize both.  
 
Section 4.1 Policy for tackling the Caseload Crisis 
 
There are three types of agents in the SC.  To start with, such an assumption precludes all 
possibilities of further referrals or re-appeals for any party involved and that all decisions 
made are final.  In other words, this renders the alternative payoff available to all parties, 
zero.  The individuals who are party to this optimization problem are namely a 
representative Judge of the Supreme Court, the litigants whose appeal to the Supreme 
Court and a social planner/policy maker (The Chief Justice of the SC in consultation with 
the Law Ministry, as discussed above) who decides on the socially optimal number of 
Supreme Court judges.  While the optimizing decisions taken by the judge and the 
litigant are strictly functions of their own incentive compatible choices, the decision of 
the social planner has only normative implications.  
 
The Judge intends to provide an efficient – time and quality wise – ruling on the cases 
he/she presides over, and the litigant wants to get a second (and the highest) decision by 
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spending more time (and fees) on the case which he/she has already fought once (or 
more) before in the lower courts.  
 
The policy maker (the Supreme Court Chief Justice in consultation with the Law 
Ministry) decides on the number of judges. The litigants decide on appealing to the 
Supreme Court based on the information about the number of judges available and the 
decision trend on the review of cases filed.  Finally, each judge decides on the time to be 
spent for settling (ta) a case and the number of cases to be disposed (ad) given the number 
of judges “n” and the number of appeals “a”.  The sequence of events is depicted in the 
diagram (Fig. 1) below.    
     Fig. 1 
 
    t=0                             t=1        t=2                          
 
 
Policy           Litigants       Judge                                                       Dates 
Maker  decide on appeals      chooses  
Chooses      “ta” and “ad” 
“n”  
      
 
Thus, we are ready to propose the individual decision making problems and solve the 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (hereafter described as SPNE) of the game starting at 
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date t = 1 as well as the Social Optimum at date t = 0. We start to compute the values of 
the model by backward induction as follows: 
1) we first compute the last stage (t = 2) optimizing choice of the judge j(n,a) 
2) we next compute the SPNE of the game beginning at t =1 with the choice of 
appeals a(n, j(n,a)) 
3) we then solve for n which maximizes social welfare function 
 
Section 4. 1.1  Optimization problem of the Judge 
 
The representative judge faces at the SC a time constraint in the disposition of cases as 
shown below in eqn (2). The representative judge faces a certain number of appeal cases, 
and given her/his time constraint, can only decide or dispose off a fraction of appeals 
depending on the average time given to each case. The judge gains in utility if she/he can 
give adequate time in hearing and deciding a case, this is captured in the first term of the 
utility function of the judge in eqn (1).  However, the judge incurs utility loss (in terms of 
conscience, reputation etc.) the higher the time taken to decide a case. The utility loss is 
higher, the lower is the caseload per judge because the there is delay despite the judge not 
being over-burdened.  The utility loss is also higher, the lower the number of cases 
disposed. The first effect dominates for low value of average time taken to dispose of a 
case ( at ), and the second effect dominates for all values of at above a threshold level 
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where, 
n
aC =  = Caseload per SC judge 
ad = Number of cases actually decided or disposed off by the representative SC judge 
a = Total number of cases filed at the SC 
n = Number of judges in the SC 
 T = Total Time available to the representative SC judge to decide appeal cases  
at = Time spent by the judge in reaching a decision on each appeal case 
00 , βα = Parameters (with positive values)  
FL < fL < FU    
The judge decides on what should be the optimal time spent per case ( *at ) to reach a 
decision.   
Thus, putting the value of ad from (2) in (1), and by differentiating (1) with respect to at , 
we obtain the FOC: 
0
..
2 00 =−=′ aJ t
aT
nU βα , which solves for, 
n
Ta
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0
0*
2β
α
=                                        (3) 
Also, 0<′′JU  satisfying the SOC. 
Note that equation (2) gives the optimal choice in the last stage (date t = 2 ) of the game. 
This will be used in computing the optimal choice in the preceding stages and the 
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the whole game in the way discussed below. Let us 
denote the optimizing choice of the judge as a function j(n,a) as interpreted in equations 
(1) and (2). 
 
Next, consider the following.  
Section 4.1.2  Problem of the Litigant 
 
[ ]0),(max LaiL ftVPU −=               (4) 
where, iP  = Probability that the i
th
 litigant wins the case 
Lf = Fee paid by the litigant while his/her case is being considered in SC ( Lf > 0) 
V = Pay-off if the litigant wins the case (V > 0). 
Therefore, equation (3) implies that the “ith” litigant compares the expected return from 
winning the case given the payoff from winning V and given the probability iP  and the 
expenditure during the time when the case is heard by the judge in reaching a decision 
( at ).  The alternative pay-off is clearly zero, when the case is turned down for further 
review in the SC.  Thus, there exists a probability Pi*, at which, a litigant is indifferent 
between filing and not filing the case. Litigants with iP above Pi
*will have positive 
expected from filing an appeal and will therefore file appeals while those below Pi* will 
refrain from filing appeals. This in turn determines the total number of cases a*, filed in 
the SC  in the following way.  Assume that the litigants are uniformly distributed over the 
probability of winning the case over the zero to one interval, i.e., ]1,0[∈iP  with 
probability density function (pdf) f(Pi) = 1 for all i. From equation (3) above, for the 
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litigant at the margin 0)( =− Lai ftVP , such that,  
)(1 ** Lai ftVP = , where, n
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Given the uniform distribution of litigants on the probability of winning, 
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iii PdPPf .  The litigants who are distributed in the zone where the probability 
of winning the case is at least *iP would be those who file the case with the SC.  In other 
words, the total number of cases filed in the SC at any point in time is given by,  
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Let us denote the SPNE value a* = a(n, j(n,a)) as interpreted in equations (4), (5) and (6).  
We can now also calculate the SPNE values of the following: 
Equation (5) can be used to find the optimal caseload per judge, since 
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Now that the judge knows the total volume of cases filed in the SC, he/she optimizes on 
his/her time spent for disposing each case satisfactorily based on a*.  Thus substituting 
a* in (2), we get,    
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Also, from (2) and (8), we get *da = V
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Equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) give the values of the endogenous variables in the SPNE of 
the game starting at date t = 1 (starting with the choice of the litigants) with respect to the 
policy parameter “n” and other exogenous parameters of the model. 
  
Section 4.2.3  Sensitivity Analysis of the SPNE 
 
Now consider some changes in these equilibrium values with respect to the litigation cost 
fL: 
 
Proposition 1: As the litigation fee fL increases 
(a) The caseload per judge falls  
(b) The time taken to decide a case falls  
(c) The number of cases appeals fall 
(d) The number of cases disposed of per judge increases 
(e) Proportion of appeals undecided falls  
 
The results follow directly from equations (6), (7), (8) and (9). 
 
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows: as the litigation cost increases, more 
potential litigants find appeals suboptimal and the number of appeals fall. This reduces 
the caseload per judge. The judge now has less excuse to take a higher time per case and 
thus time taken to decide a case also falls. Given the time constraint of the SC judge, this 
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implies a higher number of cases disposed of per judge. It directly follows that the 
proportion of undecided cases also rises and backlogs fall. 
 
Table 1. Solutions with respect to fL           
Serial 
No. of  
Problems 
of the 
Social 
Planner 
Maximization Problem of the Social 
Planner (with social welfare functions 
indexed by the value P) 
Solution Condition 
P = 1 Max U1SW = - a* FU unambiguous 
P = 2 Max U2SW = - C* FU unambiguous 
P = 3 Max U3SW = - ta* FU unambiguous 
P = 4 Max U4SW = + ad* FU unambiguous 
P = 5 
Max U5SW = *
*
dna
a
 
FU unambiguous 
 
The social welfare implication of proposition 1 is quite straightforward: litigation costs 
should be increased at the SC level through high court fees, attorney fees etc. However, 
litigation costs should not be so prohibitively excessive that those denied justice in lower 
courts cannot afford to appeal and litigate. For the poorer section of the society the ability 
to access justice should be explored more through temporary courts, consumer courts, 
tribunals, quasi-regulatory bodies etc. without making it necessary for them to approach 
the SC level. Table 1 summarizes the findings. 
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The next few exercises generate propositions regarding the effects of increasing the 
number of judges on the different dimensions of social welfare. 
 
Proposition 2: As the number of judges increase  
(a) The caseload per judge falls  
(b) The time taken to decide a case falls 
(c) The number of cases disposed per judge increases  
The intuition for (a) is as follows: since the number of appeals increases in less than 
proportion with respect to “n”, the caseload per judge falls. The intuition for (b) is as 
follows: as the increase in the number of judges reduces the caseload per judge, the 
representative judge finds delay more costly in terms of utility maximization and reduces 
the optimal time taken *at . The interpretation for (c) follows directly from (a) and (b). 
 
Next, let us investigate as to what happens to the equilibrium number of appeals if the 
number of judges increases, i.e., 
n
a
∂
∂ *
.  From (6),  
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Thus we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.  An increase in the number of judges unambiguously raises the 
equilibrium number of litigants (appeals).  
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 The intuition for proposition 2 is as follows: since the time taken to decide an appeal 
falls with respect to “n”, a greater proportion of litigants find it optimal to litigate (as can 
be seen straightforwardly from the uniform distribution function of Pi). 
 
Section 4. 4 Problem of the Social Planner 
 
Given the above solutions, the only choice variable whose optimum value remains to be 
determined from the system is n*, which when substituted to the above solutions would 
determine the equilibrium for the entire system at the social optimum.  The social planner 
(P) may have to choose from a number of social welfare (SW) policy goals depending on 
the type of the social planner: 
(a) The type P = 1 social planner wants to minimize the number of appeals 
(b) The type P = 2 social planner wants to minimize the per judge caseload 
(c) The type P = 3 social planner wants to minimize the average time taken by a 
judge in disposing of a case 
(d) The type P = 4 social planner wants to maximize the number of cases disposed 
per judge 
(e) The type P = 5 social planner wants to minimize the fraction of backlogs (or 
maximize the proportion of the total number of appeals disposed of). 
The optimization problem is with respect to bench strength or the number of judges n* 
and subject to the following constraint: nL n≤ ≤  nU where: 
nL is the minimum number of judges required for efficient functioning of the judiciary 
based on all procedural and substantive questions of law and administration, and  
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nU is the maximum number of judges determined by the scarcity of efficient judges at the 
Supreme Court level as well as determined by administrative and cost factors. We now 
derive another proposition before we collect all our results about the problem of the 
Social Planner with respect to the optimal number of judges in a SC. 
 
Proposition 4. The rate of Backlogs or court congestion B = 
*
*
dna1
a
− decreases with n 
and therefore minimizing court congestion requires setting n = nU.
 
 
 
The problem of the social planner is as follows: Max U 5 SW = *
*
dna
a
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The social welfare utility function is positive, increasing and convex in “n” starting with 
a positive intercept. 
V
Tf
n
n
U LSW 24
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> 0 
Hence   n = nU  
From the Comparative Statics and Proposition 4, we get the following Proposition 
summed up in the tabular form: 
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Proposition 5. The optimal bench strength will be at the lower or upper bound 
depending on the type of the social welfare function as follows: 
 
Table 2. Solutions with respect to n           
Serial 
No. of  
Problems 
of the 
Social 
Planner 
Maximization Problem of the Social 
Planner (with social welfare functions 
indexed by the value P) 
Solution Condition 
P = 1 Max U1SW = - a* nL unambiguous 
P = 2 Max U2SW = - C* nU unambiguous 
P = 3 Max U3SW = - ta* nU unambiguous 
P = 4 Max U4SW = + ad* nU unambiguous 
P = 5 
Max U5SW = *
*
dna
a
 
nU unambiguous 
 
 
As Table 1, indicates, almost all social welfare policies (with respect to bench strength or 
the number of SC judges) are maximized by having as many judges as are feasible under 
the constraints on the scarcity of efficient judges at the Supreme Court level as well as 
determined by administrative and cost factors of hiring SC judges. The only exception 
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being the social welfare policy that tries to minimize appeals: it recommends keeping the 
number of judges as low in number as possible. When one considers a social welfare 
policy that tries to target all the problems (delay, workload, congestion, high litigation, 
excessive appeals, problems in the quality of justice etc. encountering the SC) at the same 
time, an obvious tradeoff arises. According to the weight placed on social welfare 
function 1 the number of the judges should be lowered, while the weights placed on other 
social welfare functions imply that they cannot be lowered too much. In other words, if 
all social welfare functions are assigned positive weights, we must have an interior 
solution for n: the solution n* should have the property that nL < n* < nU . The higher the 
weight placed on minimizing appeals, the lower should be n* (while the converse is also 
true). Thus, if excessive appeals are to be discouraged by the SC, an increase in delay, 
workload, backlogs and low disposition of cases per judge may have to be tolerated. As 
mentioned before, delay or workload may not always be social evils but may turn out to 
be advantageous in societies with highly litigious propensities that need to restrict appeals 
through the legal hierarchy. Our theoretical and policy implications are borne out in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix. Over the years, increasing the number of judges in the Indian 
SC have contributed to lower caseloads and backlogs but have led to higher appeals. 
 
 
Section 2.2 A Corruption Proof Strategy 
 
 
In this section I consider only on corruption proof strategy. 
Consider a two stage game where the policy maker moves first and then a SC judge 
determines his strategy regarding receiving a bribe. 
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In stage 1, the SC determines a compensation package for judges subject to a budget 
constraint T = n.C(sj) where  
T is the budget (from taxation) 
N is the number of judges 
C(sj) is the salary for a SC judge 
Let b be the maximum amount of a bribe that can be given to a SC judge. 
In stage 2 the judge decides whether to take the bribe. If he is indifferent then he does not 
take the bribe. 
Let q be the probability of getting caught and let m(i) be the money value of 
impeachment which is the disutility of getting caught. (It is assumed that the bribe is non-
appropriable even if the judge is caught after taking the bribe). 
Let T be the budget for salaries of SC judges and n the required number of judges. 
Optimal compensation for a judge is b – qm(i) = C(sj)=(T/n) 
(It is assumed that b – qm(i) < T ) 
Two observations are in order here: 
a) The higher is b, the lower is n since average compensation increases. Given the 
high value of stakes in a SC, it is no wonder that the salaries are quite high and 
the number of judges low. Realistically, it is also difficult to determine the 
maximum amount of a bribe that a litigant can offer since it not only involves the 
value of the law suit to each litigant but also the transaction cost incurred by each. 
A reasonable method of estimation is b = max [v(p) – tc(p),v(d) – tc(d)] where p 
stands for plaintiff and d for defendant. It is instructive to note that maximum 
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bribe can be reduced through reduction of the present value of the suit through 
lengthening the duration of the litigation. 
b) The higher is q, the higher is n 
 
Section 5. Qualitative Policy Instruments 
 
In this section, we discuss the following: the effective use of other qualitative policy 
instruments in a strategic setting. The qualitative instruments we discuss are judicial 
review, legal innovations, standards of review, and decentralization of the judiciary 
organization. Let us briefly review each of them in turn.  
 
The tasks of judicial review are essentially meant to uphold the Constitution on matters of 
substantive law in new legislation, check the legality of procedures and operations in the 
implementation of legislation and administrative actions, and protect the individual 
citizen of the state with respect to his or her fundamental property rights, contractual 
rights and tort claims as indicated by the Constitution. Generally, it is thought desirable 
for the judiciary to leave the fundamentals of strategic planning and execution (with 
respect to the economy and the polity) to the executive and the legislature as much as 
possible. Judicial review of the Executive and the Legislature by the Supreme Court is 
the most important power that SC has, and it should be used with utmost caution and 
prudence so as to keep the sanctity of the separation of powers and the allocative 
efficiency it entails. If a particular legislation or a statute or an action of the executive 
violates any aspect of the Constitution or goes against social welfare in an obvious way, 
then the SC can intervene and overturn such a decision or action. However, the SC can do 
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so if and only if, the matter reaches the SC as an appeal. To appreciate the strategic role 
that judicial review can play in maximizing social welfare, one has to understand the 
strategic interaction between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary in terms of 
governance with separation of powers (see Segal (1997) for an analysis how judicial 
review varies with different Congressional preferences in USA). The separation of 
powers involves conflict and competition (checks and balances), cooperation (without 
cooperation between these different arms of the government, the administration of a state 
comes to a standstill), as well as coordination (with a proper monitoring and allocation of 
tasks to achieve each goal and sub-goal of governance).  It has been argued by a number 
of authors, that in USA, the Congress and the President hold a big power in overriding 
(Dahl (1957)) and circumventing (Epstein, Knight and Martin (2001)) court decisions. 
They can do so by virtue of being able to leverage certain critical strategic variables18, as 
documented by Rosenberg (1991). Therefore, as far as conflict and competition are 
concerned, in order to strengthen its position, the judiciary should signal that it is strong 
and therefore can take costly actions that cannot be mimicked by weak judiciaries, and 
pose credible (sub-game perfect) threats against unconstitutional, socially harmful 
legislation, statutes or government action which are contemplated. (However, as we have 
indicated earlier, the issue can only be decided by the SC if it reaches the SC as an 
appeal. Nonetheless, if the social or political issue under consideration is only partially 
resolved by executive action and / or legislation, we can reasonably expect that they 
become subject to lawsuits and reach the SC as appeals with very high probability.) The 
                                                 
18for example, to use the confirmation power of the senate in selection of judges, enact 
constitutional amendments, initiate appointment and impeachment of judges, reduce the 
appellate jurisdiction of SCs, require supermajorities by the court in declaring legislation 
unconstitutional and any other way to reduce the power of the court 
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judiciary should put all its weight in declaring them illegal and in committing to follow 
up on its threats through negative judgments, and if necessary hold the legislators liable, 
bring impeachment against the executives etc. The judges of the SC should be 
independent minded even if appointed by the executive and should evaluate each other on 
a regular basis of peer monitoring and peer pressure system. The judiciary should acquire 
a reputation of toughness by constantly challenging unconstitutional acts and legislations 
which raise the costs of rivals in legislatures and in the executive branch of the 
government. However, when the judiciary becomes dependent on the other branches of 
the government for the enforcement of laws pertaining to judicial review, it has to select 
its strategy subtly so that it has the backing of the public and some sections in each arm 
of the government. Yet, the judiciary should not be overzealous and remember that 
judicial self-restraint is an important virtue since judicial power is also of an 
“encroaching nature” and if stretched too much, may lead to lack of freedom of the 
citizen and inefficiency in governance. The principles of self restraint are given in the 
Appendix 3. keeping in mind that judicial review is a delicate and last resort action, must 
cooperate and coordinate with the other arms of government efficiently and fairly 
wherever and whenever socially desirable. Further, it must be remembered that a 
judiciary which generally practices self restraint, comes out strongly against a legislation 
or an executive action, then it gets a high attention and support from the public. So 
practicing self-restraint generally is also strategically optimal. 
 
Legal innovation can occur through procedural simplification, a change in the 
interpretation of an important precedent or through filling a gap left by precedents or 
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through legal transplantation. Procedural simplification is usually designed for reducing 
court time of administration and trial time in adjudicating decisions and for facilitating 
the communication of judicial decisions. When excessive red tape, bureaucratic filters 
and rules clog the path of law and justice, simplification of procedures bring in efficiency 
gains. However, such simplification should still contain the system of checks and 
balances expected from any reasonable set of procedures. Court administration becomes 
better through more efficient paperwork processing, by court staff and communication of 
information and command within the administrative hierarchy. The time cost of trial falls 
with simple rules that reduce frequency of hearing the same case and with the reduction 
in the need of required protocols and paperwork. Sometimes the use of history and its 
weight needs to be re-judged in light of radically different circumstances. Such 
circumstances point to the needs of forward looking and consequentialist approach to 
judicial decisions that can be rendered by reinterpreting or reversing important 
precedents. Under stable socio-economic and political conditions, precedents should play 
the guiding hand in judicial process through systematic interpretation by judges. 
However, as the social, economic and political environment of a country or a region 
changes, the value of old precedents also changes and need reinterpretation. Examples 
can be found in the case of innovations in Tort Law which mitigates moral hazard 
problems by the provision of incentives. Moreover, sometimes old precedents may not 
guide the decision making in particular cases and leave gaps to be filled by creating new 
precedents (see Cardozo (1961)). This is the substance of indigenous legal innovation. 
Examples can be found in the fields of intellectual property rights and the law of 
telecommunications. Sometimes, a legal transplantation can also become an important 
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legal innovation. Though legal transplantations are brought about through legislation, the 
SC of the relevant country has an important and obvious role in it by demanding legal 
transplantation and preparing the legal system for change by adapting to new laws thus 
brought about from outside. When law needs to lead socio-economic and political 
change, the Benthamite project of supremacy of legislation over judge made law has to 
be invoked, and the SC has to demand such changes and play the role of catalyst as well 
reshape the new legal framework through proper adaptation and interpretation of such 
laws. Moreover, when social change outpaces possible innovations brought through 
adjudication, then regulation becomes the most effective weapon to deal with new 
demands and again common law is required only to interpret such regulations. When the 
effective legal innovations cannot be brought into the existing legal framework of a 
country, the SC of the country may demand that a legal transplantation be brought in 
through legislation. Legal transplantation should only be used when it suits the beneficial 
dynamics of law and the market economy of the country in question, and the efficient 
governance of institutions (Milhaupt and Pistor (2008)). Legal transplantation can be 
especially useful for a less developed country with underdeveloped public and 
commercial laws and / or a country that needs to harmonize its laws within its economic 
region for greater compatibility in trade and production. Also legal transplantations are 
useful to bring about effective rule of law whenever a legal system of a state has been 
deemed to offer a low protection for citizens, property rights and contracts (UN mediated 
effective rule of law in Cambodia in recent times is an example). However, SCs judges 
might find it hard to adapt to transplanted rules and precedents in the common law 
system and this might endanger higher workload, congestion and delay as well greater 
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number of appeals created through induced legal uncertainty and complexity. A solution 
can be to have special benches that have judges who are trained and empowered to decide 
on cases where the legal rules have been heavily transplanted. Attempts should be made 
to fit the imported laws to the existing demands for them and the country legal 
infrastructure.  
 
Standard of review, in legal parlance, means the amount of deference that an appellate 
court like the SC, gives to an appeal from a lower court. A high powered standard of 
review at the SC level implies, that it shall not overturn a decision from a lower court like 
a high court unless the case was decided with some obvious error on the part of the 
judiciary at the lower court level in choosing a particular set of precedents and its 
constitutional interpretation to decide a case. This has an obvious implication on the 
process of appeals, the incentive to appeal and the manner in which an appeal will be 
screened at an appellate court like a SC. A high powered standard of review can reduce 
the incentive for appeals and the rate of appeals to a SC but it may also increase the 
probability that a judicial error at a lower court will not be detected or corrected. Strategic 
analysis of standards of review sheds light on the tension between the right to hear a 
legitimate appeal and the excessive accommodation to appeals. By maintaining a high 
powered system of standards of review, the policy maker can reduce the caseload per 
judge and give him less excuse for delay as a result of which delay and backlogs fall and 
timely and quality wise administration of justice increases. Surely, the rate of appeals will 
increase with reduced caseload per judge and lower litigation cost, but it should also be 
noted, that judges would have to spend less time in screening appeals because of the 
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system of a high powered standards of review. However, this system runs the danger of 
rejecting legitimate appeals from the lower courts and therefore an acceptable tradeoff 
has to be decided upon. An optimal strategy can be such as to show maximum deference 
to lower courts as and when the lower court decisions take into account the precedents 
created by higher courts like the SC. We call such a system a semi-strong standard of 
review. 
 
The design of the judiciary organization is an extremely important issue and here also the 
SC together with the law ministry, plays an important role. The SC can recommend the 
degree of decentralization, delegation and the appropriate quasi-judicial and regulatory 
authorities to be formed and governed. At the same time, it must be remembered that the 
SC does not always have the power of administrative supervision and control of the lower 
courts (e.g. as in India, by Article 136 of the Indian Constitution). The caseload burden of 
the SC judges can be reduced by a prudential decentralization of the judiciary 
organization. Law tribunals can be set up to hear cases pertaining to company law, 
taxation, bankruptcy proceedings, industrial disputes, etc. and complemented by creating 
regulatory institutions with respect to stock exchange, public health, education, social 
welfare etc. Only appeals with specific merits from these tribunals and quasi-regulatory 
bodies may be tried at the SC level. Judges from different High Courts can be appointed 
specially to sit on these tribunals. Lower down the judicial hierarchy, the jurisdiction of 
District Courts and Consumer Courts should be increased. The Consumer Courts will 
hear petty disputes speedily and with low court fees to settle all kinds of problems 
regarding consumer protection and their verdicts will be final (appeals if any, will be 
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heard by the same courts). The poor will certainly benefit from this. Lower courts will 
thus have more jurisdiction at their levels. The High Courts and other appellate courts 
should also have similar increase in jurisdiction such that there will be less appeals to the 
SC level. The decentralization of the judiciary organization will thus reduce SC caseloads 
and appeals. However, the lower courts must have access to high quality judges and good 
infrastructure and must be able to address the problems of controlling judicial 
inefficiency, moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Further, the lower courts 
should be motivated by the rule of law. 
 
Section 6. Conclusion 
 
Our basic conclusions regarding the design of judiciary organization and instruments that 
cut across differences in legal and economic scenarios of different countries are quite 
simple and enumerated below: 
• Improvement in substantive law can be brought about through legal innovations 
and legal transplantation according to the needs of the economy. Considerable 
exercise in interpretation should be done by the SC judges to in adapting the 
transplanted laws in the indigenous legal system. Improvements in procedural law 
should be brought about through streamlining procedures and reduction of 
necessary paperwork. 
• When we consider the policy instrument like court fees at the SC level, we find 
that increasing litigation cost upto the feasible maximum generates the highest 
social welfare with respect to all the problems discussed. However, litigation 
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costs should be kept low in lower courts based on universal access to justice 
principle, even if this policy leads to excessive litigation and caseloads.  
• With respect to the policy instrument of the number of judges, in each case we get 
an unambiguous solution, though in one case the solution is different. Essentially, 
we find, that increasing the number of judges increases the number of appeals to a 
SC since higher number of judges means a lower workload per judge which gives 
him less excuse for delay thereby reducing the litigation cost of appeals which in 
turn increases the number of appeals. However, increasing the number of judges 
in a SC reduces the magnitude of other problems like caseload, backlogs, and 
timely disposition of cases. 
• A semi-strong standard of review which sets a high powered standard of review 
and only considers appeals when important precedents and Constitutional rules 
have been violated should be most suitable.  
• A more rational organization of the judiciary should be based on the principle of 
decentralization (through quasi-judicial bodies that decentralizes the province of 
law and justice and with focus on speedy and low cost dispensation of justice at 
the lower levels of the judicial hierarchy). It should also be based on the principle 
of containment of appeals at each level of the legal hierarchy, through lower 
courts having more autonomy such that the caseload problem at the SC level falls. 
A suit originating at any level of the legal hierarchy should be discouraged to be 
taken up to the next level (particularly the SC) for rehearing via appeals. There 
should be focus on speedy and low cost dispensation of justice at the lower levels 
of the judicial hierarchy  
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• An efficient system of judicial review should be in place which keeps governance 
fair, efficient and stable and the judiciary being proactive when there is a 
possibility that it is deemed to be weak and practicing “self restraint” otherwise. 
 
We now conclude by commenting how these goals and instruments can be achieved in 
different socio-economic and political settings. 
 
In economically advanced, socio-politically stable and financially developed economies, 
legal and judicial reform has a long history. In most of them, the persistent problems 
discussed have been tackled by different measures but have met with varied and limited 
success due to transaction complexity of markets, contracts, institutions and networks and 
because of the of policy measures which have not taken into account the behavioral 
reactions of the public, litigants, attorneys, courts and judges to judicial reform policies. 
Our game theoretic approach should inform their policy and theoretical initiatives. 
Further, our approach can be suitably adapted as a response to the emerging problems in 
these economies like problems with respect to the new and continuing demands to human 
rights, corporate governance, accounting, information disclosure and new kinds of 
financial and political crises.  
 
In emerging market economies and mixed economies with a long history of rich 
admixture of imported and indigenous commercial legal systems (take India as a prime 
example), the primary focus should be to create a more rational and decentralized 
organization of the judiciary. Innovations like high SC court fees and low court fees for 
  
49 
the poorer sections in the lower courts and legal transplantations and better standards of 
review at the SC level should also be introduced. In this connection, it should be 
mentioned that some special tribunals like BIFR (Bureau of Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction) in India, that deals with restructuring bankrupt business enterprises, have 
accumulated too may undecided cases over the years (see Table A.2 in the Appendix), 
and is being considered for a complete overhaul through a new bill in the Parliament. 
Therefore, there is a need for a proper governance of quasi-judicial bodies as well, and 
part of the responsibility will have to be shared by legal policy makers of a country like 
the Law Ministry and the SC.  
 
In underdeveloped economies with colonial legal, administrative and economic histories, 
the problem of any kind of reform is problematic in terms of opposition from different 
pressure groups and ideologies and traditions. Judicial reform attempted in such countries 
should be sensitive to these conditions and try to implement them in the framework of a 
comprehensive sustainable and inclusive development process with gradual approval of 
the public, the media and governments through debates, discussions and socially 
acceptable experiments. Policies that target indigenously based legal innovations stand 
better chance of success. 
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Appendix 1.  Case Disposal Rate at Supreme Court of India 
Table A1. Absolute Number of Cases Filed and Disposed for the SC in India 
2-5 years 
(including 
those 
taking 2 
years and 
excluding 
those 
taking 5 
years) 
5-10 years 
(including 
those 
taking 5 
years and 
excluding 
those 
taking 10 
years) 
10-25 
years 
(including 
those 
taking 10 
years and 
excluding 
those 
taking 25 
years) 
25 years and 
more 
Year Filed Total 
Number 
of Cases 
Disposed 
off by the 
Supreme 
Court 
Total 
Bench 
Strength 
of the 
Supreme 
Court 
(NO. OF 
HON'BL
E 
JUDGES
) 
0-2 years 
(excluding 
those taking 
2 years) 
    
1981 31040 18690 15 8078 851 986 475 3 
1982 43510 29112 14 12583 1326 1535 740 5 
1983 55902 45824 17 19806 2087 2416 1165 8 
1984 49074 35547 18 15364 1619 1874 904 6 
1985 51592 51078 15 22077 2326 2693 1299 9 
1986 27881 30700 14 13269 1398 1619 781 5 
1987 28040 21807 16 9425 993 1150 555 4 
1988 27721 19895 20 8599 906 1049 506 3 
1989 27469 21400 22 9249 974 1128 544 4 
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1990 28488 25238 24 2103 221 515 16 1 
1991 32501 35341 24 6971 940 1342 196 0 
1992 26686 35847 24 13439 1437 2676 846 3 
1993 21648 20884 23 15755 1656 2474 1778 0 
1994 42046 47890 22 19671 2160 5159 2029 2 
1995 51443 68337 23 23244 3118 9232 2500 1 
1996 33406 46216 22 22817 3213 2837 3745 1 
1997 32355 36569 23 20331 2047 2181 1532 16 
1998 36559 35233 22 17316 1508 902 822 10 
1999 34683 34707 23 17070 1534 1097 984 16 
2000 37111 35300 24 16953 1902 873 508 8 
2001 39419 38842 26 18614 1826 775 378 16 
2002 44052 42439 25 20002 1691 1359 259 15 
2003 50394 47979 24 20322 2345 1873 269 5 
2004 58931 55530 25 21082 1720 1908 73 10 
2005 46137 42841 22 20894 2143 900 55 3 
Data Source: The Supreme Court of India (Office of the Registrar) 
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Appendix 2. Performance of the Bureau of Industrial Financial Reconstruction 
(India)  
 
Table A.2  Performance of BIFR  
 
Cases Disposed off during the Year         Year Total 
Cases 
Regd.  
during 
the Year 
Cases 
under 
Revival 
Cases 
Revived 
Winding up 
Recomended 
Dismissed 
Bench 
Month * cases 
disp in 
the year 
cases 
undisp 
in the 
year 
Cum 
Cases 
Reg 
Cum 
cases 
disp 
1 2 3a 3b 3c 3d 4 5 6 7 8 
1987 311 0 0 0 8 24 8 303 311 8 
1988 298 0 1 12 29 36 42 256 609 50 
1989 202 0 1 31 78 42 110 92 811 160 
1990 151 3 3 43 44 48 93 58 962 253 
1991 155 4 4 47 28 42 83 72 1117 336 
1992 177 8 7 30 42 36 87 90 1294 423 
1993 152 9 13 64 59 36 145 7 1446 568 
1994 193 10 37 79 48 45 174 19 1639 742 
1995 115 22 25 64 29 48 140 -25 1754 882 
1996 97 29 93 85 25 38 232 -135 1851 1114 
1997 233 13 36 85 22 25 156 77 2084 1270 
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1998 370 13 21 50 36 11 120 250 2454 1390 
1999 413 13 10 65 70 27 158 255 2867 1548 
2000 429 10 37 153 158 36 358 71 3296 1906 
2001 463 50 47 133 118 36 348 115 3759 2254 
2002 559 74 34 143 252 36 503 56 4318 2757 
TOTAL 3759 258 369 1084 1046 566         
Data Source: BIFR Website 
  
59 
 
Appendix 3. Principles of Judicial Self-Restraint 
 
1. Before the Court will glance at a particular issue or dispute officially, a definite “case” 
or “controversy” at law or in equity between bonafide adversaries under the Constitution 
must exist, involving the protection or enforcement of valuable legal rights, or the 
punishment, prevention or redress of wrongs directly concerning the party or parties 
bringing the justiciable suit. 
2. Closely related to the need for the presence of a case or controversy is the logical 
demand that the party or “parties” bringing suit must have “standing”. 
3. The Court does not render advisory opinions, i.e. judicial rulings upon the 
constitutionality of government actions in the absence of a case or controversy requiring 
such a ruling for its disposition – nor do the lower federal constitutional courts. 
4. Not only must the complainant if federal court expressly declare that he is invoking the 
constitution of the United States – but a specific live rather than a dead constitutional 
issue citing the particular provision on which he relies in that document must be raised by 
him; the Court will not entertain generalities. 
5. The Court will not pass upon the Constitutionality of a statute or of an official action at 
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits, but then decides to challenge 
its legality anyway. 
6. All remedies in the pertinent lower courts must have been exhausted, and prescribed 
lower court procedure duly followed, before making application to the Supreme Court for 
review. 
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7. Assuming it has been properly raised, the federal question at issue must be substantial 
rather than trivial; it must be the pivotal point of the case; and it must be part of plaintiff’s 
case rather than part of his adversary’s defense. 
8. The Supreme Court will review only questions of law and not normally the questions 
of fact. 
9. The Supreme Court will never be bound by it’s precedents. 
10. The Supreme Court can defer certain actions to the legislature or the executive. 
11. In the event of a validly challenged statute, the presumption of its constitutionality is 
always in its favor. 
12. If a case or controversy can be decided upon any other than constitutional grounds – 
such as by statutory construction, which constitutes the greatest single area of the Court’s 
work, or if it can rest on an independent state ground – the Court will be eager to do so. 
13. The Court will not ordinarily impute illegal motives to the law makers. 
14. If the Court does find that it must hold a law unconstitutional, it will usually try hard 
to confine to the holding to that particular section of the Statute which was successfully 
challenged on constitutional grounds, - provided such a course of action is feasible. 
15. A legislative enactment – or an executive action – must be unwise, unjust, unfair, 
undemocratic, injudicious, - but still be constitutional in the eyes of the Court. 
16. The Court is not designed to serve as a check against inept, unwise, emotional, 
unrepresentative legislators.  
 
Source: Henry Abraham (1975) “The Judicial Process” 
